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Abstract 
This paper aims at proposing measures of polarization for the distribution of a 
variable when information on the latter is only ordinal. The measures proposed 
are borrowed from the recent literature on the measurement of segregation. An 
empirical  illustration  is  given,  based  on  the  European  Union  Statistics  on 
Income  and  Living  Conditions  (EU-SILC)  for  the  year  2008.  The  ordinal 
variable refers to the „ability to make ends meet‟ and polarization is measured 
between  groups  defined  by  the  citizenship  of  the  household  member  who 
answered  the  household  questionnaire.  Results  show  that  Luxembourg  and 
Estonia have the highest degree of polarization whereas Cyprus, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom display the lowest degree.  
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1. Introduction 
Much research has been devoted in recent years to the study of polarization, a 
concept  which  refers  somehow  to  the  clustering  of  incomes  around  local 
poles.  The  literature  has  generally  made  a  distinction  between  two  broad 
approaches  to  this  topic.  Polarization  may  on  one  hand  take  the  form  of 
bipolarization, a situation where there are many people who are very poor but 
also a significant class of very rich individuals. An important gap separates 
them so that in such a case there is no sizeable middle class. On the other 
hand polarization has also been linked to social conflict, the idea being that it 
is polarization rather than inequality which fuels social conflict. Those who 
view polarization as  bipolarization and link it  to the disappearance of  the 
middle  class  have  mainly  extended  the  path  breaking  work  of  Foster  and 
Wolfson (1992;2010), while those for whom the concept of polarization is 
related  to  the  notions  of  social  conflict,  have  based  their  analysis  on  the 
concepts of "identification" and "alienation" introduced in the very important 
contributions of Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos et al. (2004). Whereas 
the approach of Esteban and Ray (1994), as well as that of Zhang and Kanbur 
(2001), assumes that the groups are defined before measuring polarization, 
Duclos et al. (2004) extended the analysis by letting the data determine the 
groupings of individuals. 
The  novelty  of  the  present  paper  is  that  it  proposes  measures  of 
polarization in the case of an ordinal rather than cardinal variable. Let us 
suppose, for example, that a survey is conducted where individuals are asked 
to say whether they are able to make ends meet and the possible answers are 
(1) with great difficulty (2) with difficulty (3) with some difficulty (4) fairly 
easily (5) easily (6) very easily. Moreover it is assumed that information is 
also available on the population subgroup (e.g. ethnic group, gender, area of 
residence) to which the individuals belong. Borrowing ideas (e.g. Reardon, 
2009) on the measurement of the inequality of the distribution of an ordinal 
variable between a given number of categories and assuming the presence of 
a certain number of (unordered) population subgroups, this paper considers 
that polarization is negatively related to the share of within groups inequality   3 
in  the  inequality  of  the  distribution  of  the  ordinal  variable  in  the  whole 
population (all subgroups being merged). Such an approach was in fact taken 
by  Zhang  and  Kanbur  (2001)  who  wrote  that  “...polarization  measures 
discussed so far aim to capture the „clustering‟ along the income dimension 
into high and low income groups. However, debates on polarization are often 
conducted  in  the  framework  of  recognized  and  accepted  non-income 
groupings. In the US, for example clustering of black and white income levels 
is as much concern as the disappearing middle class. In China…geographical 
clustering of income is a major policy concern…"  
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  reviews  quickly  the 
literature  on  the  measurement  of  polarization  in  the  case  of  a  cardinal 
variable. Section 3 proposes then new measures of polarization in the case of 
an  ordinal  variable  while  Section  4  presents  a  short  empirical  illustration 
based on the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 
(EU-SILC) database for the year 2008. 
2. On the measurement of polarization in the case of a cardinal 
variable 
There are essentially two ways of apprehending the concept of polarization in 
the economic literature (see, Nissanov et al., 2010). A first approach puts the 
emphasis  on  the  notion  of  bipolarization,  a  situation  where  you  have  a 
significant  number  of  people  who  are  very  poor  but  you  have  also  a 
significant  amount  of  very  rich  individuals.  There  is  a  big  income  gap 
between these two groups and this probably implies that there is no sizeable 
middle class. Such an approach clearly defines the (two) groups on the basis 
of their income. 
The  second  approach  to  polarization  looks  at  the  extent  to  which 
population is clustered around a small number of distant poles. The idea is 
that political or social conflict is more likely, the more homogenous, separate 
and of a similar size the groups are. Such a view was introduced by Esteban 
and Ray (1994) for whom society can be thought of as an amalgamation of 
groups, in  the sense that  two individuals  drawn from  the same  group  are   4 
assumed to be "similar" while two persons belonging to different groups will 
be considered as "different" with respect to a given set of attributes. Esteban 
and  Ray  (1994)  postulate  that  polarization  is  related  to  two  behavioral 
functions:  identification  and  alienation.  Identification  is  an  increasing 
function of the number of individuals who are in the same income class as a 
given  individual.  In  other  words,  an  individual  feels  some  degree  of 
identification with those who are “close” to him. The alienation function on 
the contrary characterizes the antagonism caused by income differences: an 
individual feels alienated from those who are “far away” from him. While 
Esteban and Ray (1994) had assumed that the population subgroups were well 
defined, Duclos et al. (2004) let the data determine the various poles. In the 
present  paper  we  will  assume  that  the  population  subgroups  are  known, 
before analyzing the data. However, the subgroups will not be defined on the 
basis of the incomes of the individuals but on that of other socio-economic 
characteristics such as ethnicity.  
Let us now take a closer look at the approach stressing the notion of bi-
polarization. This concept was introduced in the economic literature by Foster 
and Wolfson (1992; 2010) and Wolfson (1994) who defined what they called 
polarization curves. Their first polarization curve turns out to be related to the 
concept of "increasing spread" while the second is also linked to the notion of 
"increased bipolarity". Without entering into details we can say that the idea 
of  "increasing  spread"  implies  that  moving  from  the  middle  position  (the 
median) to the tails of, say, an income distribution will make the distribution 
more  polarized.  This  clearly  implies  that  a  rank  preserving  increment  in 
incomes above the median or a rank preserving reduction in income below 
the median will widen the distribution, that is, increase the distance between 
the two groups (those above and below the median) and hence increase the 
degree of bi-polarization.  
The concept of "increased bipolarity" refers on the contrary to the case 
where  the  incomes  below  the  median  or  those  above  the  median  become 
closer to each other. This corresponds to a kind of "bunching" of the two 
groups in the sense that the gaps between the incomes below the median (or   5 
those above the median) have been reduced. In such a case bi-polarization is 
assumed to increase. 
These  two  notions  of  "increased  spread"  and  "increased  bipolarity" 
explain  why  "inequality"  and  "bi-polarization"  are  two  different  notions. 
Whereas any regressive transfer (transfer from a poor to a richer individual) 
will increase inequality, it will increase the degree of bi-polarization if this 
transfer takes place across the median (that is, if money is transferred from an 
individual with an income below the median to one with an income above the 
median) but will decrease bi-polarization if it takes place on the same side of 
the median (if money is transferred from an individual with an income below 
the median to a richer individual whose income remains below the median 
income or if money is transferred from an individual with an income above 
the median to another richer individual). 
Several cardinal measures have been proposed to evaluate the degree of 
bi-polarization (see, for example, Foster and Wolfson, 1992, Wang and Tsui, 
2000, Rodriguez and Salas, 2003, Deutsch et al., 2007) as well as polarization 
(see, Esteban and Ray, 1994, Zhang and Kanbur, 2001, Duclos, Esteban and 
Ray, 2004, Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia, 2006, Esteban et al., 2007, Poggi 
and Silber, 2010).  
Of particular interest, as far as the purpose of this paper is concerned, is 
the  approach  taken  by  Zhang  and  Kanbur  (2001).  They  focus  on  two 
concepts:  (i)  the  degree  of  homogeneity  within  each  group;  and,  (ii)  the 
degree of heterogeneity across  groups. The idea is  that  high within-group 
homogeneity  is  bound  to  increase  polarization  while  clear  differences 
between  two  groups  will  also  increase  it.  These  two  concepts  can  be 
quantified using the concepts of “within group inequality” (representing the 
spread  of  the  distributions  in  the  groups)  and  “between  group  inequality” 
(measuring  the  distance  across  the  groups  means)  for  decomposable 
inequality measures.
2  
                                                 
2  This  conceptual  framework  can  clearly  be  also  re-interpreted  in  terms  of  the  identification-alienation 
terminology mentioned previously: within group inequality represents a loss of identification and between 
groups inequality is a proxy for alienation.   6 
Zhang and Kanbur (2001) proposed thus to use as polarization index the 
ratio of the between- to that of the within-groups inequality expressed as 
 
) / ( W B T T ZK    (1) 
 
where  B T  and  W T  refer respectively to the between and within groups Theil 
indices. Since groups may be defined on the basis of a second characteristic 
(rather than on the basis of income only) the distributions of the different 
groups may overlap.  
Deutsch et al. (2007), extending previous work of Berrebi and Silber 
(1989) on the measurement of the flatness of  a distribution, defined a bi-
polarization measure  G P  as  
 
G W B G I G G P / ) (      (2) 
where GB and GW refer respectively to the between and within groups Gini 
indices while  G I  is the value of the Gini index in the whole population.
3 
Since in the case of non -overlapping groups the overall Gini index may be 
expressed (see, Silber, 1989) as 
W B G G G I     (3) 
we may combine (2) and (3) and derive that, in the case of non overlapping 
income groups,  G P  may be written as 
) /( ) ( W B W B G G G G G P       (4) 
Poggi and Silber (2010) extended this approach to the case of overlapping 
groups
4 and defined the index  G P  in such a case as 
) /( ) ( OVERLAP G G G G P W B W B G        (5) 
where  OVERLAP refers  to  the  residual  of  the  decomposition  of  the  Gini 
index by population subgroups (see, Silber, 1989). 
                                                 
3 Deutsch et al. (2007) limited their analysis to the case of bi-polarization, that is, they assumed that the 
population is divided into two groups of equal size, the “poor” being those whose income is smaller than the 
median income and the “rich” those with an income higher than the median income 
4 It does not matter what the number of groups is.   7 
Whether (in the case of several population subgroups) one adopts the 
formulation  proposed  by  Zhang  and  Kanbur  (2001)  or  that  suggested  by 
Poggi and Silber (2010), it is clear that polarization is assumed to increase 
with  the  between  groups  inequality  and  decrease  with  the  within  groups 
inequality. If we adopt a decomposable inequality measure, such as the Theil 
index, this implies that polarization could also be measured via the ratio of 
the between groups inequality to total inequality, that is, via the complement 
to one of the ratio of the within groups inequality to total inequality. This is 
precisely  the  approach  that  will  be  adopted  in  the  next  section  where 
measures of polarization are proposed in the case of an ordinal variable.  
3. On the measurement of polarization when the variable 
analyzed is ordinal 
Let us assume, for example, that the variable analyzed is the one mentioned 
previously, namely one that is ordinal and which measures the standard of 
living of individuals on the basis of a question where they are asked to say 
whether they are able to make ends meet and given six possible (ordered) 
answers. For simplicity, we will still call "income" such a variable but in what 
follows it should be remembered that "income" refers to an ordinal and not a 
cardinal variable.  
Suppose therefore that there is a  I (  by  J ) matrix whose lines  i and 
columns  j  refer respectively to (unordered) population subgroups (e.g. ethnic 
groups) and to the (ordered) income category to which an individual belongs. 
The typical element  ij X  of such a matrix will thus indicate the number of 
individuals who belong to ethnic group i and are in income category  j . Call 
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.  We  may 
therefore define the distribution (among the various income groups) of  the 
individuals who belong to population subgroup i as  ) ,..., ,..., ( , , 1 , J i j i i i p p p p   8 
. Actually since  J i p ,  is by definition equal to 1, we may as sume that the 
income distribution of the individuals belonging to population subgroup  i is 
well  defined  by  the  vector  ) ,..., ,..., ( 1 , , 1 ,
'
  J i j i i i p p p p .  The  distribution  of 
individuals  in  the  whole  population  (including  together  all  the population 
subgroups)  will  be  defined  by  the  vector  ) ,..., ,..., ( 1 1
'
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We have however to remember that we know only to which income 
category  a  given individual  belongs  so  that  we  cannot really  measure  the 
inequality of the income distribution among individuals belonging to a given 
population subgroup, using traditional income inequality indices such as the 
Gini, Atkinson or generalized entropy indices. We could eventually transform 
the histogram describing such an income distribution, using the kernel density 
function technique, but this approach may be problematic for the first group 
and  especially  for  the  last  group  which  generally  does  not  have  an  upper 
bound.  
There  exists  however  an  alternative  solution.  We  know  that  these 
income categories are ordered so that we can use inequality indices which 
have been developed for the case of ordered categories (see, Abul Naga and 
Yalcin, 2008, Reardon, 2009, and Dutta and Foster, 2010). Allison and Foster 
(2004)  were  in  fact  the  first  to  have  stressed  that  using  the  traditional 
(cardinal  or  ordinal)  approach  to  inequality  measurement  with  ordered 
variables  is  problematic,  to  say  the  least.  They  recommended  using  a 
"median-based" ordering and argued that a distribution  } {z   exhibits more 
inequality  than  a  distribution  } {w  if  } {w  may  be  derived  from  } {z  via  a 
sequence of "median preserving spreads". Allison and Foster (2004) limited 
their study to the analysis of the ranking of distributions of ordinal variables. 
Reardon (2009), on the contrary, proposed cardinal measures of the degree of 
inequality of the distribution of an ordered variable. Then, assuming that such 
a  distribution  may  be  observed  for  several  population  subgroups,  he 
considered that segregation should measure the extent to which the degree of 
inequality  of  the  distribution  of  an  ordinal  variable  within  unordered   9 
population subgroups is small when compared to the degree of inequality of 
the distribution of this variable in the whole population. 
This idea of defining (between groups) segregation as the ratio of the 
between  groups  over  the  total  inequality  reminds  us  however  of  the  way 
Zhang and Kanbur (2001) measured polarization, since they had assumed that 
the latter should be measured via the ratio of the between over the within 
groups inequality. This is why, we propose that the degree of polarization of 
the distribution of an ordinal variable should be related to the extent to which 
the ordered  groups  are  evenly distributed  across  the unordered population 
subgroups  (what  Reardon  had  called  „evenness‟).  Borrowing  mostly 
Reardon's (2009) ideas on the measurement of segregation as well as some of 
Silber and Yaloneztky's (2010) suggestions concerning the measurement of 
equality of opportunity when one of the variables is ordinal, we will assume 
that such a measure of polarization should have the following properties:  
Maximum and minimum polarization of the distribution of an 
ordinal variable  
-  Between  groups  polarization  will  be  minimal  if  within  each  population 
subgroup  i  the  distribution  of  the  individuals  among  the  various  ordered 
categories is equal to that in the whole population. In other words, in such a 
case, we should observe that  j i p P j i j i , , ,   . 
-  Between groups polarization will be assumed to be maximal if within each 
population subgroup i all the individuals belong to the same ordered category 
so that  j i p ,  is equal to either 0 or 1, for all population subgroups iand ordered 
categories  j .
5  
Invariance of polarization to the total size of the population 
                                                 
5 We evidently assume in this case that the category to which all the individuals in subgroup i belong, is not 
the same for the different groups.   10 
If the number of individuals belonging to population subgroup  i and to the 
ordered  category  j   is  multiplied  by  a  constant   ,  and  if  such  a  change 
occurs  for  all  population  subgroups  and  ordered  categories,  polarization 
should  not  vary.  In  other  words  the  total  size  of  the  population  does not 
matter. It is only the relative distribution of the ordered categories among the 
various unordered population subgroups which is important. 
"Swap"  of  individuals  between  unordered  population 
subgroups 
Before  explaining  this  assumption,  we  have  to  define  some  concept  of 
dominance. We will say that the income distribution of population subgroup 
h dominates that of population subgroup  k  over the ordered categories  f to 
l  (where  ) 1 J l f     if  j k j h p p , ,    for all  ) ,..., ( l f j .  In other words, 
population subgroup  h dominates population subgroup  k  over the ordered 
categories  f to l if there is a greater proportion of the population subgroup k  
than  of  population  subgroup  h  at  or  below  each  ordered  category  from 
category  f to l. 
Given  this  definition  of  dominance  of  a  population  subgroup  over 
another, we will now make the following assumption. If the distribution of 
population subgroup  h dominates that for population subgroup  k  over the 
ordered categories  f  to  l, and if an individual in the ordered category  f  
could be moved from population subgroup k  to population subgroup h while 
an  individual  belonging  to  the  ordered  category  l  would  be  moved  from 
population  subgroup  h  to  population  subgroup  k ,  then  polarization  will 
decrease. 11 
 
Table 1: Illustrating the concept of "swap" of individuals between unordered 













A  14  16  26  44  100 
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A  15  16  25  44  100 
B  37  28  23  12  100 
 
The  intuition  here  is  that  if  we  could  (theoretically)  "swap"  individuals 
belonging to different income classes in a way that makes the distributions of 
the individuals  (among the income classes)  in  two  (unordered)  population 
subgroups more similar to  one another,  then polarization should decrease. 
Table  1  gives  an  illustration.  It  is  easy  to  observe  that  in  Case  1,  the 
distribution of the individuals belonging to population subgroup A dominates 
that of the individuals belonging to population subgroup B. If we could now 
move an individual belonging to population subgroup A from the high to the 
medium  income  class  and  another  individual  belonging  to  population 
subgroup B from the medium to the high income class (see case 2), we would   12 
conclude that polarization decreased because the disparity between the two 
population subgroups in the cumulative proportions of individuals at or below 
medium  and  high  income  classes  has  been  reduced,  while  the  other 
(cumulative) proportions did not change.  
"Swap" of individuals between ordered categories 
If  the  distribution  of  the  individuals  belonging  to  population  subgroup  h 
dominates that of the individuals belonging to population subgroup  k  over 
the  income  classes  f to  l,  (where  ) 1 J l f    ,  and  if  an  individual 
belonging  to  income  class  f   is  moved  from  population  subgroup  k   to 
population subgroup  h while an individual belonging to income class  J  is 
moved  from  population  subgroup  h  to  population  subgroup  k ,  then  the 
resulting decrease in polarization will be greater than the one that would be 
observed  if  an  individual  belonging  to  income  class  f   is  moved  from 
population  subgroup  k   to  population  subgroup  h  while  an  individual 
belonging to income category  l is moved from population subgroup  h to 
population subgroup k . 
The idea here is that the principle of "swap" should be sensitive to the 
ordering of the categories involved. "Swaps" of individuals who are farther 
apart (as far as their income class is concerned) should have a greater impact 
on polarization than "swaps" of individuals who are closer (as far as their 
income class is concerned).  
This is illustrated in Table 1 by comparing Cases 1, 2 and 3. Case 3 is 
derived  from  Case  1  by  moving  an  individual  who  belong  to  population 
subgroup A from the high income class to the low income class (and not to 
the medium income class as in Case 2) and another individual belonging to 
population subgroup B from the low income class (and not from the medium 
income class as in Case 2) to the high income class. As a consequence the 
decrease in polarization will be greater when we compare Cases 1 and 3 than 
Cases 1 and 2. 
   13 
Merging Population Subgroups 
If  M  unordered population subgroups are gathered into a smaller number of 
L unordered groups, then it will be assumed that polarization may be broken 
down into the sum of within  and between population subgroups polarization.   
Merging Ordered Income Categories 
If  F ordered  categories are  bunched  into  a  smaller  number  of  G  broader 
ordered categories through the merging of adjacent categories, then it will be 
assumed that polarization may be broken down into the sum of polarization 
within and between the broader categories. 
Measuring inequality in the case of ordered categories 
As  mentioned  previously,  the  list  of  the  assumptions  that  have  been 
considered as  desirable  for measuring  polarization in  the case where only 
ordinal  information  is  available  concerning  the  variable  under  study  was 
borrowed from work on the measurement of occupational segregation in the 
case where occupations may be ordered (see, Reardon, 2009). As mentioned 
previously, we combine here the idea that segregation could be measured as 
the ratio of between groups to total inequality (see, Reardon and Firebaugh, 
2002, Watson, 2006, and Jargowsky and Kim, 2009) and the proposition of 
Zhang and Kanbur (2001) who recommended measuring polarization as the 
ratio of between over within groups inequality. In other words we will assume 
that polarization, in the case of ordered categories, amounts to measuring the 
ratio of the inequality between the unordered population subgroups to  the 
overall inequality. Since we stated previously that overall inequality should 
be  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  inequality  between  and  within  population 
subgroups,  we  may  also  state  that  polarization  may  be  measured  as  the 
complement to 1 of the ratio of the inequality within unordered population 
subgroups to the overall inequality. 
To measure the degree of inequality of the distribution of an ordinal 
variable within unordered population subgroups we will follow the work of   14 
Reardon  and  Firebaugh  (2002)  on  the  measurement  of  multi-group 
segregation and make two assumptions. First we will consider that the degree 
of  inequality  of  the  distribution  of  an  ordinal  variable  within  unordered 
population groups is equal to the weighted sum of the inequality within the 
various unordered population groups, the weight of each group being equal to 
its share in the total population.  Second we will follow again Reardon (2009) 
in defining our measure of the inequality  i   of the distribution of an ordinal 
variable within a given unordered population subgroup. Before doing so we 
need  to  understand  how inequality  should  be  measured  in  the  case  of  an 
ordinal variable. Reardon (2009) suggested that for an ordinal variable that 
includes  J  ordered categories (implying in our case that the income classes 
are labeled as  J j ,..., 1  ) inequality will be assumed to be maximal (and thus 
normalized to 1) when half the population belongs to income category 1 and 
half  to  income  category  J .  Conversely  Reardon  (2009)  suggested  that 
inequality will be minimal (and normalized to 0) when all individuals belong 
to some income class  0 j j   with  0 j varying from 1 to  J .  
As a consequence, as stressed by Reardon (2009), defining the degree 
of inequality of the distribution of an ordinal variable amounts to measuring 
how close the distribution of the ordinal variable will be to these minimal and 
maximal bounds. 
As mentioned previously the income distribution of the individuals who 
belong  to  population  subgroup  i  is  well  defined  by  the  vector
) ,..., ,..., ( 1 , , 1 ,   J i j i i i p p p p .  At  the  light  of  what  we  wrote  before  we  may 
therefore state that inequality will be maximal when the distribution of the 
individuals  in  the  whole  population  will  be  defined  by  the  vector 
)) 2 / 1 ( ),..., 2 / 1 ( ), 2 / 1 (( ) ,..., ,..., ( 1 1    J j P P P P . This corresponds evidently to 
the case where half the individuals belong to the poorest income class and 
half to the richest. 
We may also note that there are  J  cases where there is no inequality at 
all, that is, where all the individuals belong to the same income class. In such   15 
a case we would write that  ) 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 ,..., 0 , 0 (  P  and state that  0  j P  for  l j   
and  1  j P for  l j  where lcan take any value between 1 and  J . 
















where  ) ( j P f  is a continuous function defined on the interval [0,1] such that 
) ( j P f is increasing when  )
2
1
, 0 (  j P , decreasing when  ) 1 ,
2
1
(  j P , maximal 
(with a value of 1) over the interval [0,1] when 
2
1
 j P  and minimal (with a 
value of 0) over the interval [0,1] when  0  j P or  . 1  j P  
Reardon (2009) suggested four possible functional forms for  f . 
The first one
6 is written as 
)] 1 ( log ) 1 ( log [ ) ( 2 2
1
j j j j j P P P P P f        (7) 
The second one is expressed as 
) 1 ( 4 ) (
2
j j j P P P f     (8) 
The third functional form is 
) 1 ( 2 ) (
3
j j j P P P f     (9) 
Finally the fourth functional form is  
1 2 1 ) (
4    j j P P f   (10) 
We may then replace  f  in (6) with one of the functional forms given in 
expressions (7) to (10) and derive, as a consequence, four possible measures 
of variations which will henceforth be expressed respectively as  3 2 1 , ,    and 
4  .  
                                                 
6 Note that in defining 
1 f it is assumed that  0 ) log ( lim ) 0 log 0 ( 2 0 2    x x x    16 
One may note that each of these measures of ordinal variation reaches 
its maximum value of 1 only in the case where half the population belongs to 
the poorest income category ( 1  j ) and half to the richest income category 









(  P . 
Similarly each of the four measures of ordinal variation will reach its minimal 
value of 0 only when all the individuals belong to the same income category. 
In such a case the vector P  will be written as  ) 1 ..., , 1 , 0 ..., , 0 , 0 (  P . 
Let us call  i s  the share of unordered population subgroup i in the total 
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where   , which is defined in (6) refers to the degree of inequality of the 
distribution of the ordinal variable in the whole population while  i   measures 
this inequality  within population subgroup i. Note that expression (11) may 















 measures within population subgroups inequality while  , as 
already stressed, measures inequality in the whole population. 
We can now replace  and  i  in (12) with one of the functional forms 
defined  in  expressions  (7)  to  (10)  and  hence  derive  four  measures 
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One may note the links between 
1 POLOR  and information theory (see, Theil, 
1967), 
2 POLOR   and  the  concept  of  diversity  (see,  Lieberson,  1969)  and 
4 POLOR  and the notion of dissimilarity (see, Duncan and Duncan, 1955). 
Properties of the polarization indices 
It  is  easy  to  verify  that  the  four  measures  of  polarization 
3 2 1 , , ( POLOR POLOR POLOR  and   )
4 POLOR  are bounded between 0 and 1. 
The maximum value of 1 is observed when for each population subgroup all 
the  individuals  belong  only  to  one  income  class.
7  In such a case within 
population subgroups inequality is minimal and hence polarization, which is 
measured by the ratio of between to the overall variation, will be maximal. 
One may also observe that polarization will be minimal when for each 
population subgroup the distribution of individuals among the various income 
classes is the same. This clearly implies that there is no polarization, since the 
distribution of the individuals among the income classes does not depend on 
the population subgroup to which they belong. 
Note also  that all four indices of  polarization  obey the principle of 
invariance to the size of the population since these indices will not vary when 
                                                 
7 As already mentioned in footnote 5,  it is evidently assumed that not all the population subgroups are 
concentrated in the same income class. Otherwise the classification into different income classes would be 
irrelevant.   19 
the number of individuals in each cell of the matrix { ij X } is multiplied by a 
constant. 
One may also show (see, Reardon, 2009) that three of the four indices 
(what we have called 
2 1,POLOR POLOR and 
3 POLOR ) obey the principle of 
"swap"  of  individuals  between  unordered  categories,  which  was  defined 
previously. One should not be surprised to find out that the index 
4 POLOR
does not obey this principle, since it is related to the dissimilarity index and it 
is well known in the literature on income inequality measurement, that the 
index of dissimilarity generally does not obey the principle of transfers. 
Note  that  the  indices 
2 1,POLOR POLOR and 
3 POLOR   obey  the 
principle of "swap" of individuals between ordered categories and satisfy the 
additivity condition defined previously when mentioning the case of merging 
subpopulations. These polarization indices however do not obey the additivity 
condition  defined  when  mentioning  the  case  of  merging  ordered  income 
categories (see, Reardon, 2009, for more details). 
4. An Empirical Illustration 
In  this  section,  we  use  our  proposed  measures  to  assess  the  extent  of 
polarization  in  terms  of  self-assessed  ability  to  make  ends  meet  between 
nationals  and  foreigners  in  European  countries.  We  use  the  2008  cross-
sectional data from the European Union - Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions  (EU-SILC).  EU-SILC  is  an  instrument  aiming  at  collective 
comparable cross-sectional and longitudinal micro-data on income and living 
conditions (Wolff et al., 2010). The micro-data collected at household and 
individual levels are meant to be representative of the population living in 
private households in each of the participating countries. EU-SILC is now the 
reference dataset for comparative analysis of income distribution and living 
conditions in the European Union (EU) and official statistics regarding the 
EU  indicators  of  social  inclusion  (Atkinson  et  al,  2002)  and  the  EU2020 
social  inclusion  target  (Atkinson  &  Marlier,  2010)  are  derived  from  this 
survey.   20 
EU-SILC has a legal basis making its implementation in EU member 
State compulsory. The scope of EU-SILC is indeed defined by the Council 
and  European  parliament  regulation  1177/2003  (amended  by  Regulations 
1553/2005 and 1791/2006 to extend EU-SILC in new Member States) which 
provides all the necessary information about the definition of target variables, 
sampling rules, sampling sizes or tracing rules. However, it should be noted 
that EU-SILC is based on the idea of a common framework and is not a fully 
harmonized survey. The common framework consists of common procedures, 
concepts, rules and recommendations but flexibility is left in order for each 
country to integrate this new instrument into its own national system of social 
surveys. 
EU-SILC was launched in 2003 in seven countries under a gentleman‟s 
agreement  and  was  later  gradually  extended  to  15  countries  in  2004,  25 
countries in 2005 and 2006, and to all the EU27 countries (plus Norway, 
Iceland  and  Switzerland)  starting  in  2008  on.  Data  on  France,  Germany, 
Malta, Slovenia and Switzerland were however not available in the EU-SILC 
Users‟  Database  to  which  we  had  access.  In  addition,  in  our  empirical 
analysis the unordered categories refer to the citizenship of the household 
member who answered the household questionnaire. We excluded countries 
in which there were less than 5% of non locals. Our working dataset is hence 
composed of 11 countries (see Table 2 for a list of the countries covered and 
their abbreviations). 
The question we are interested in asks households‟ respondents whether 
they are able to make ends meet and six possible answers were proposed, as 
mentioned previously: (1) with great difficulty (2) with difficulty (3) with 
some  difficulty  (4)  fairly  easily  (5)  easily  (6)  very  easily.  This  question 
appears in the household questionnaire so that we use the household as the 
unit of analysis (see Table A1 for the number of observations per country). 
Table 2 gives the distribution of this variable for each country as well as the 
median category.    21 
























AT  All  5.1  9.6  26.9  27.8  22.5  8.2  4 
(Austria)  local   4.9  9.0  26.5  28.3  23.2  8.1  4 
   other  6.6  16.9  31.5  21.4  14.2  9.5  3 
BE  All  8.1  14.4  23.5  26.9  23.0  4.1  4 
(Belgium)  local   7.7  14.0  23.4  27.4  23.5  4.0  4 
   other  13.4  20.1  23.9  20.3  17.6  4.7  3 
CY  All  19.5  32.0  31.0  11.9  4.6  1.0  2 
(Cyprus)   local   19.6  32.1  31.6  11.9  4.0  0.8  2 
   other  18.9  31.9  26.1  11.2  9.3  2.6  2 
EE  All  3.4  9.3  28.9  50.4  7.4  0.6  4 
(Estonia)  local   2.4  7.8  27.0  53.7  8.4  0.7  4 
   other  8.5  17.1  39.3  32.9  2.1  0.0  3 
ES  All  12.2  17.0  30.6  26.8  12.4  1.0  3 
(Spain)  local   11.6  16.5  30.8  27.4  12.7  1.0  3 
   other  23.3  27.1  27.1  16.0  6.2  0.3  2 
GR  All  20.8  33.8  26.0  13.3  5.3  0.8  2 
(Greece)  local   19.7  33.9  26.4  13.6  5.6  0.8  2 
   other  37.8  32.6  19.9  8.6  0.9  0.2  2 
IE  All  8.5  14.2  34.2  29.0  10.2  4.0  3 
(Ireland)  local   8.2  14.2  33.7  29.5  10.3  4.1  3 
   other  12.3  14.0  41.4  21.4  8.9  2.0  3 
IT  All  17.3  20.5  38.8  18.1  4.7  0.6  3 
(Italy)   local   16.9  19.9  39.2  18.6  4.8  0.6  3 
   other  24.6  30.7  32.4  8.6  3.0  0.7  2 
LU  All  2.0  4.8  12.6  29.7  40.1  10.8  5 
(Luxembourg)   local   1.3  2.7  8.8  28.2  46.7  12.3  5 
   other  3.0  8.1  18.9  31.9  29.6  8.5  4 
LV  All  15.4  27.5  35.7  18.6  2.6  0.3  3 
(Latvia)   local   13.8  26.0  36.7  20.3  2.9  0.4  3 
   other  21.9  34.1  31.4  11.3  1.3  0  2 
UK  All  6.4  9.9  25.4  37.5  14.0  6.9  4 
(United-
Kingdom)  local   6.4  9.8  25.3  37.5  14.0  6.9  4 
   other  6.2  12.6  26.5  36.4  12.9  5.4  4 
Source: EU-SILC 2008 cross-sectional data-files, version UDB 01.08.10 Authors‟ calculation. 
The unit of analysis is the household 
 
The country with the highest median is  Luxembourg whereas Cyprus  and 
Greece display the lowest median. There are clearly differences between the 
countries  but  it  is  important  to  recall  that  the  proposed  measures  of   22 
polarization do not depend on the overall amount of ordinal variation in the 
population but on differences between unordered categories in the distribution 
of  the  variable  under  scrutiny.  As  already  mentioned,  the  unordered 
categories  refer  here  to  the  citizenship  of  the  household  member  who 
answered the household questionnaire. There are two unordered categories: 
„local‟  or  „other‟  (see  Table  A2  for  the  distribution  of  this  variable  by 
country). Table 2 gives also the distribution of the ability to make ends meets 
separately  for  the  local  citizen  and  the  other  household  respondents.  The 
medians for "locals" and "others" often differ within countries, being lower 
for foreigners ("others") than for locals in seven countries (AT, BE, EE, ES, 
IT, LU, LV).  
Table 2 shows that in addition to variation across countries, there is also 
variation  within  countries.  We  now  compute  the  indices  of  polarization 
defined in the previous section. The left panel of Table 3 presents the values 
of the four indices and the right panel present the normalized values of these 
indices so that the degree of polarisation of the country with the highest value 
of the index is 1 and that of the country with the lowest value is 0.  
Note that the value for the index POLOR
1 is missing in Latvia (LV) 
because  the  distribution  of  the  variable  for  the  non  locals  in  that  country 
contains an empty cell so that a logarithmic formulation cannot be used.  
Table 3: Value of the Polarization indices in 2008,  
Non normalized  Normalized (value-min)/(max-min) 









AT  0.0031  0.0037  0.0022  0.0078  0.0955  0.1094  0.0707  0.0747 
BE  0.0027  0.0031  0.0021  0.0097  0.0841  0.0905  0.0656  0.0929 
CY  0.0030  0.0014  0.0041  0.0000  0.0924  0.0365  0.1353  0.0000 
EE  0.0301  0.0313  0.0289  0.0716  1  0.9634  1  0.6859 
ES  0.0065  0.0077  0.0050  0.0004  0.2109  0.2306  0.1680  0.0041 
GR  0.0063  0.0065  0.0058  0.0000  0.2053  0.1942  0.1947  0.0000 
IE  0.0018  0.0019  0.0015  0.0000  0.0519  0.0517  0.0465  0.0000 
IT  0.0036  0.0044  0.0025  0.0066  0.1119  0.1296  0.0807  0.0635 
LU  0.0298  0.0325  0.0239  0.1044  0.9892  1  0.8268  1 
LV    0.0119  0.0118  0.0269    0.3615  0.4053  0.2579 
UK  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  0.0000  0  0  0  0 
min   0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0000         
max  0.0301  0.0325  0.0289  0.1044         
Source: EU-SILC 2008 cross-sectional data-files, version UDB 01.08.10.  Authors‟ calculation.   23 
 
To allow a better reading of the results, Table 4 presents the same results but 
here  countries  are  ranked  according  to  the  value  of  each  index.  We 
highlighted in grey the countries mentioned before for whom the median for 
locals and for others differ. It appears that, whatever the polarization index, 
Luxembourg (LU) and Estonia (EE) are the two top ranked countries and the 
United Kingdom (UK) is the country with the lowest degree of polarization.  
Table 4: Value of the Polarization indices in 2008,  






EE  0.0301  LU  0.0325  EE  0.0289  LU  0.1044 
LU  0.0298  EE  0.0313  LU  0.0239  EE  0.0716 
ES  0.0065  LV  0.0119  LV  0.0118  LV  0.0269 
GR  0.0063  ES  0.0077  GR  0.0058  BE  0.0097 
IT  0.0036  GR  0.0065  ES  0.0050  AT  0.0078 
AT  0.0031  IT  0.0044  CY  0.0041  IT  0.0066 
CY  0.0030  AT  0.0037  IT  0.0025  ES  0.0004 
BE  0.0027  BE  0.0031  AT  0.0022  IE  0.0000 
IE  0.0018  IE  0.0019  BE  0.0021  GR  0.0000 
UK  0.0002  CY  0.0014  IE  0.0015  CY  0.0000 
LV     UK  0.0002  UK  0.0002  UK  0.0000 
Source: EU-SILC 2008 cross-sectional data-files, version UDB 01.08.10  Authors‟ calculation. 
 
One may also note that the seven countries for which the median category is 
higher  for  the  "locals"  than  the  "others"  (foreigners)  are  those  where 
polarization is highest, when the index Polor4 is used.  
In Table 5 we give the ranking of the different countries based on the 
data  of  Table  3;  the  country  with  the  highest  (resp.  lowest)  value  of  the 
polarization index receives a rank of 1 (resp. 10).  We excluded Latvia (LV) 
for which no result was available for the POLOR
1 index. For each country a 
Borda score is then obtained by adding up the rankings for each index of 
polarization.  The  Borda  rank  is  then  simply  the  ranking  of  the  countries 
according to their Borda score (see, Qizilbash, 2004).     24 
Table 5: Ranking of the different countries by polarization index in 2008,  




4  Borda score  Borda ranking 
EE  1  2  1  2  6  1 
LU  2  1  2  1  6  1 
ES  3  3  4  6  16  3 
GR  4  4  3  8  19  4 
IT  5  5  6  5  21  5 
AT  6  6  7  4  23  6 
BE  8  7  8  3  26  7 
CY  7  9  5  9  30  8 
IE  9  8  9  7  33  9 
UK   10  10  10  10  40  10 
Source: EU-SILC 2008 cross-sectional data-files, version UDB 01.08.10.  Authors‟ calculation. 
Countries are ranked according to their Borda score/ranking 
These results confirm what had been previously observed. Luxembourg (LU) 
and Estonia (EE) are the two countries where polarization is highest and the 
United Kingdom (UK) is the country with the lowest degree of polarization. 
As could be expected, for three of the four countries (Cyprus (CY), Ireland 
(IE) and the United Kingdom (UK))  for which the median category is similar 
for the "locals" and for the “others" the Borda score/ranking is the highest 
(polarization is the lowest).  
Finally,  we  assessed  the  rank  robustness  of  our  results  computing 
multivariate  concordance  indices  (see  Seth  and  Yalonetzky,  2010).  The 
Kendall‟s W coefficient of concordance (see, Kendall and Gibbons, 1990) is a 
non parametric statistic ranging from 0 (when there is no concordance in the 
ranking between the indexes) to 1 (when there is complete concordance.  This 
index was found to be equal to 0.821 (with a boostrapped standard error of 
0.112  for  1000  replications).  We  may  therefore  reject  the  hypothesis  of 
independence between the countries and the polarization indices and conclude 
that  there  is  a  positive  and  significant  correlation  between  the  different 
polarization indices. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper aimed at proposing measures of the degree of polarization of the 
distribution of a variable when information on the latter is only ordinal.  The 
measures  proposed  were  borrowed  from  the  recent  literature  on  the   25 
measurement of segregation and derived from the idea that polarization is 
related  to  the  existence  of  differences  between  the  relevant  unordered 
categories in the distribution of the ordinal variable analyzed.  
An empirical illustration was provided which used data from the 2008 
cross-sectional data of the European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions  (EU-SILC).  It  appears  that  Luxembourg  and  Estonia  have  the 
highest degree of polarization when the ordinal variable under scrutiny refers 
to the ability to make ends meet and the (unordered) population subgroups to 
the ethnicity of the respondent. We also observed that the three countries 
(Cyprus (CY), Ireland (IE) and the United Kingdom  (UK)) for which the 
median category is similar for the "locals" and for the “others" display the 
lowest degree of polarization, the UK having the lowest rank for the four 
indices. Finally we found that there was a positive and significant correlation 
between the different polarization indices.   26 
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Table A1. Number of observations by country 
Country  Frequency 
AT  5,707 
BE  6,279 
CY  3,355 
EE  4,738 
ES  12,866 
GR  6,499 
IE  5,243 
IT  20,925 
LU  3,755 
LV  5,192 
UK  8,850 
Source: EU-SILC 2008 cross-sectional data-files, version UDB 01.08.10  Authors‟ calculation. 
The unit of analysis is the household 
 
Table A2. Citizenship of the respondents by country (2008) 
Country  Local  Other 
AT  92.22  7.78 
BE  92.91  7.09 
CY  89.84  10.16 
EE  84.1  15.9 
ES  94.67  5.33 
GR  94.15  5.85 
IE  92.75  7.25 
IT  94.76  5.24 
LU  61.5  38.5 
LV  81.44  18.56 
UK  95.14  4.86 
Source: EU-SILC 2008 cross-sectional data-files, version UDB 01.08.10  Authors‟ calculation. 
The unit of analysis is the household. 
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